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Summary 
 
Many researchers accuse the Predictive Processing (PP) framework of returning to 
nineteenth-century speculations regarding the knowledge of reality, the difference between 
phenomena and things in themselves, or questions about idealism. Dan Zahavi’s (2018) harsh 
criticism follows in this tradition. He argues that the supporters of PP are not able to justify 
realism or the common sense belief that the world of objects given in experience exists 
objectively, i.e. regardless of our cognitive  capacities. In his opinion, adopting PP assumptions, 
we must abandon "our naïve realism", i.e. our conviction about the objective existence of 
everyday objects of experience, (Zahavi 2018, 48). In these considerations I will argue against 
the criticism made by this author. I will show that it can be reduced to three main objections: 
(1) representationalism objection; (2) indirect perception objection and (3) anti-realism 
objection. In response to these three objections, I will argue that Zahavi's criticism is based on 
a very selective and simplified reading of PP. Next, I will defend the thesis according to which 
perception in PP can be understood as indirect only in the psychological sense, not in 
metaphysical and epistemic. In response to the last charge, I will show that the 
representationalism postulated by conservative PP allows to justify the thesis that PP is the 
position of scientific realism. To this end, I will refer to the analysis of the concept of structural 
representations (S-representations), and then I will argue for the ontic nature of explanations 
using S-representations, based on the mechanistic model of scientific explanations. 
 
1. Predictive processing 
 
Many papers on cognitive and computational neuroscience analyse the human brain as 
a probabilistic prediction machine which minimizes prediction errors understood as signals that 
encode the discrepancies between actual and expected sensory stimulations (see Clark 2013, 
2016; Howhy 2013; Friston, 2010; Wiese, Metzinger 2017). Minimization of prediction errors 
is a fundamental function of the brain (multilevel and hierarchically organized generative 
model1) because all perception serves the aim of ensuring that the organism functions efficiently 
in the environment. The generative model generates predictions which impose a top-down 
structure on the bottom-up flow of information from the sensory input. Information in the model 
is processed in two directions: top-down (predictions about information reaching the model) 
and bottom-up (information about potential prediction errors). This means that each level of the 
model (which processes information) predicts (generates predictions) about what is happening 
at the level below, while at the same time receiving information about the magnitude of the 
predictive error. The model is effective when predictions generated at a higher level lead to 
minimization of prediction errors occurring at lower levels. Effective prediction error 
minimization presupposes a degree of precision. Precision weighing allows to determine to 
what extent a given error is precise, i.e. whether the information it carries is reliable for the 
system or not. The more precision the system attributes to a given predictive error, the smaller 
the error (Friston 2010). For example, if I expect a given predictive error to be particularly 
reliable or highly likely, then I reduce its weight, i.e. the degree to which it can affect model 
parameters. Precision is therefore a measure of uncertainty 
According to the PP framework, the brain processes information based on some form of 
statistical inference. This ability is best explained by the Bayesian model (see Hohwy, 2013; 
Harkness, Keshava 2017). It means that the central nervous system constructs and tests internal 
models of external reality by implementing cognitive processes which are approximations of 
Bayesian inference, a computational method of rationally combining existing information (at 
least some of which is uncertain) with new, unspecified data. In this approach, "uncertainty" 
means that a given piece of information may be described by means of probability distribution. 
The best possible prediction is made here by applying Bayes’ Rule, which describes the 
                                                          
1 Generally, generative models are statistical models which capture relationships between values of a set of random 
variables. These dependencies are represented by model parameters, and the variables can be observed (i.e. some 
of their values can be provided directly by the data) or hidden. In PP, the generative model is understood as such 
a statistical model whose variables are hidden, i.e. it is impossible to unambiguously assign the relevant data to 
the causal processes producing them. 
probability of a given hypothesis (prediction) based on the brain's prior knowledge of conditions 
that might be related to the incoming sensory signal. The Bayesian approach offers a rational 
solution to the problem of how the brain updates the generative model on incoming sensory 
signals and the hidden causes of these signals (Wiese, Metzinger 2017, 6).  
It must be said that there are two ways for agents to match their predictions to the world. 
In other words, a prediction error is minimized when there is a change in predictions about the 
sources of statistical information from sensory inputs. This can be achieved by either (1) 
changing the properties of the model (change of adopted predictions), i.e. the so-called 
perceptual inference; or (2) by changing the environment (active inference), i.e. an action which 
interferes with the causal structure of the world (Friston 2010, 129). Perception minimizes 
prediction errors by changing predictions, whereas action achieves this through changing the 
information reaching the model.  
 
2. Dan Zahavi’s critique of predictive processing 
 
Many authors accuse the supporters of the PP framework of returning to the 19th-century 
speculations concerning the knowing of reality, the difference between phenomena and things 
in themselves, or questions about idealism. In this context, Dan Zahavi (2018) accuses the PP 
approach discussed here of neurorepresentationism according to which the entire content of 
experience is a construction or simulation created by the brain. This is a strong objection that 
leads to a general statement that the PP approach inspired by Kant and neo-Kantism is in fact 
neurocentric and far from thinking about cognition in the categories of 4Es (embodied, 
embedded, extended, enactive). Additionally, Zahavi accuses PP's supporters of being unable 
to justify realism, i.e. of believing that the world of the objects of experience exists objectively, 
i.e. independently of our cognitive capacities. He claims that such a state of things is to be 
blamed, firstly, for equating spontaneous human cognition with the model of cognition 
developed by science (cf. also Bruineberg, Kiverstein, Rietveld 2016), and, secondly, for 
adopting representationalism which, according to Zahavi, leads to questioning the objectivity 
of the world of experience. Dan Zahavi is not isolated in his criticism of the idea of PP. Some 
researchers criticize PP for its radical neurorepresentationism, constructivism, Kantism or even 
idealism (See Anderson 2017; Anderson, Chemero 2013; Orlandi 2017). It is not difficult to 
surprise such critics, because some PP supporters claim that perception is understood here as a 
"controlled hallucination" or the experience of "virtual reality" (Hohwy 2013, 137-138). This 
is related to the general belief in PP that, because of the unexpected character of the causes of 
sensory input, the brain has to "make guesses" (Clark 2016, 2) or perceptual hypotheses about 
them. Many researchers also emphasize the Kantian character of PP (Clark 2013; Hohwy 2013; 
Gładziejewski 2016, 2017a; Swanson 2016). This is claimed to be the case, among other things, 
because of the top-down way of understanding cognition, the active and receptive character of 
the cognitive system, or the emphasis on the importance of internal representations in the 
process of cognizing the world. 
The critique of Zahavi and other authors requires an answer, because it seems that 
accepting their arguments can lead to the conclusion that we are not only dealing with the 
concept of reopening old epistemological disputes, but that we are also doomed to a number of 
metaphysical aporia dating back to the 19th century. Before providing an answer, however, I 
want to look more closely at Zahavi's objections. They can be summed up in three main points: 
 
1. Objection from representationalism: PP position leads to radical neuro-
representationalism, anti-realism and internalism showing important similarities 
between the PP account and the ideas found in and developed by German neo-
Kantians in the mid-19th-century. Zahavi claims that according to PP „the content 
of our conscious experiences is a neural construct, a brain-generated simulation” 
which means that „our access to the external world is mediated by neural 
representations, but rather that the world of experience is itself a representational 
construct” (Zahavi 2018, 47, 48). 
2. Objection from indirect perception: PP does not justify direct perceptual contact 
with the external state of affairs. According to this objection „the immediate objects 
of perception are in fact mental constructs. The visually appearing rose, the touched 
ice-cube, the heard melody, etc., are all brain generated representations, are all 
internal to and contained in the brain”. Zahavi goes on to ask: “Why are we in the 
first place considering the possibility that our objects of perception are internally 
generated constructs rather than real spatiotemporal objects? Because this is what 
our neuroscientific investigation of the brain suggests” (Zahavi 2018, 49, 54). 
3. Objection from anti-realism: PP does not accommodate „our natural inclination to 
realism” because it does not defeat the position of scientific realism. Zahavi 
wonders “how can we ever know that our scientific theories, which are offered as 
explanations of the world of experience, really capture external reality? Why are 
they not merely elaborate cognitive extrapolations that remain as brain-generated 
and as internal to our constitution as everything else?”. “How are scientists able to 
transcend their internal world simulation? How do they manage to pull off this 
epistemic achievement?”. “How the position in question (=PP) can so confidently 
embrace scientific realism?” (Zahavi 2018, 53).  
 
All these objections come down to the key question of how the PP framework can 
defend "our natural inclination for realism" (Zahavi 2018, 47), which Zahavi associates with 
naïve realism, i.e. with "our confidence in the objective existence of ordinary objects of 
experience ”(Zahavi 2018, 54)?  
 In these considerations, I formulate three responses to the objections presented by this 
author. At the beginning I will answer the objection from representationalism. I will show that 
the criticism of PP as a form of idealism, constructivism or neurorepresentationalism is based 
on a very selective reading of its various interpretations. Namely: the critique covers only those 
researchers who can be included in the conservative PP camp. Representationalism and 
internalism are important in this approach. In his critique, however, Zahavi does not refer to the 
authors representing the radical PP approach, which is not very much committed to 
representations, while emphasizing a closer relationship between the generative model and the 
environment. However, Zahavi's approach can be defended by saying, for example, that some 
anti-realist and constructivist assumptions are inscribed in the very idea of PP, based as it is on 
the inferential and constructivist treatment of perception. I will answer whether the criticism 
formulated in this way is justified. 
 In response to the objection from indirect perception, I will show that one can speak of 
the directness of perception in three irreducible senses, i.e. psychological, metaphysical and 
epistemological (Drayson 2017). Making this distinction is crucial because it is not entirely 
clear what Zahavi understands by the concepts of directness and realism. The attitude he 
defends as "our natural tendency to realism" does not allow us to justify the claim that PP is 
fundamentally constructivist and anti-realistic. I will show that it is only in the psychological 
sense that we can say that perception in PP is indirect. However, psychological indirectness 
does not automatically exclude metaphysical or epistemological directness. Zahavi's criticism 
in this approach cannot be treated as argumentative, because it is not really clear what position 
and what interpretation of this position the author argues against. 
 In response to the objection from anti-realism, I will show that the representationalism 
postulated by conservative PP allows to justify the thesis that this framework is the position of 
scientific realism. To this end, I will refer to the analysis of the concept of structural 
representations (S-representations), and then argue for the ontic nature of explanations using S-
representations based on the mechanistic model of scientific explanations. 
 
3. In response to the objection from representationalism:  
Conservative vs radical predictive processing 
 
 Even a sketchy reading of some PP studies leads to the conclusion that there is no single 
and comprehensive interpretation of this framework. On the contrary, there are a number of 
different, often mutually exclusive and critical views. Analysing this research approach, one 
can notice a number of discrepancies when it comes to the understanding of basic concepts, 
terminology, the explanatory or methodological status of every statement, as well as the role it 
can play in the cognitive science and philosophy. There are two basic approaches: conservative 
and radical (cf. Clark 2015a, 2015b; Gładziejewski 2017b; Orlandi, Lee 2018). Distinguishing 
these approaches is important because it will show the groundlessness of many PP critiques, 
including Dan Zahavi's criticism discussed here. 
  
3. 1. Conservative predictive processing 
 
 The conservative approach to PP (see Gładziejewski 2016, 2017b; Hohwy 2013; 2018; 
Kiefer, Hohwy 2018; Wiese 2016) emphasizes that the mind is relatively isolated from the 
environment, which means that its cognitive contact with the outside world has its source in the 
neuronal activity of the brain and only in it. The internal model of the world is coded at the 
neuronal level (Clark 2015a, 14). The generative model produces predictions that function as 
representations of what is happening in the external environment. This means that the 
relationship between the mind and the world is mediated by internal representations. The 
approach can be described as "reconstructive" (Anderson 2014), because in this framework the 
world model is reconstructed on the basis of internal representations of the world which are 
isomorphic with its causal structure (Gładziejewski 2016, Kiefer, Howhy 2018). Some describe 
these representations as structural because they operate on the basis of the structural similarity 
between the representation itself and what it represents (cf. Gładziejewski 2016; Gładziejewski, 
Miłkowski 2017; Kiefer, Hohwy 2018; O'Brien, Opie 2004; Shea 2014). In this context, one 
can recall the words of Hohwy who claims that "the causal net of the environment and the 
causal net represented in the internal model will mirror each other " (Hohwy 2018, 4), because 
the cognitive system is "an internal mirror of nature" (Hohwy 2013, 220). 
 Paweł Gładziejewski (2017b) points to three basic commitments characteristic of 
conservative PP. These are: 1. the commitment to representationism; 2. the commitment to use 
the concept of inference as subserving perception and action; and 3. the commitment to 
internalism as the position that cognitive mechanisms are based solely on the work of the central 
nervous system. This means that the content of mental representations is determined only by 
the internal states of the organism (see Lau 2002). 
The first commitment is particularly important for the analyses presented in this article. 
Gładziejewski claims that this commitment can be interpreted in two ways. The so-called weak 
(pragmatic) interpretation assumes that the content of mental states is attributed to the internal 
model of the world for purely pragmatic reasons. In this approach, internal representations do 
not have real content, but they are only postulated by some researchers who want to explain the 
cognitive functions of the mind (cf. Egan 2014; Downey 2017). Strong (realistic) conservative 
PP postulates that mental states contain real and causally efficacious representative content. For 
this reason, it should be stated that the generative model has real content and represents the 
world in a non-trivial way. This means that (1) it generates environment-oriented predictions 
that guide actions; (2) the function of guiding action depends on the resemblance between 
functional relationships among encoded variables and the causal structure of the environment; 
and (3) the degree of structural similarity between the environment and the model is causally 
dependent on the degree of effectiveness of the model in action. 
Assuming a strong interpretation, it should be stated that the commitment to the 
inferential nature of the relationship between perception and actions, and the commitment to 
inferentialism, are closely related and result from the commitment to representationism 
(Gładziejewski 2017b, 106, 111; Kiefer 2017). In this approach, internalism means a position 
that, in contrast to extended and embodied approaches to cognition, emphasizes that the limit 
within which one should think and study cognition is the limit of the nervous system. Thus, a 
strong interpretation of the conservative PP assumes premises for methodological 
individualism, i.e. a position that assumes that the explanation of cognitive processes and 
phenomena is carried out by analysing and explaining the cognitive mechanisms implemented 
in the brain. As a consequence, the environment and interactions with it are largely ignored, 
because they are not individual properties (cf. Fiske, Taylor 2013; Goldman 1977). The role of 
the environment and social factors is secondary. 
However, Gładziejewski emphasizes that a consistent reading of the conservative 
approach (even with a strong interpretation of the commitment to representations) allows it to 
be included in the 4E approaches to cognition. He formulates a number of arguments for this 
claim. First, representations are not static images of reality, but internal, guiding actions or 
structural representations that allow the recognition of representational errors. They are modal 
in nature and their content is constrained by the way the body is embodied and embedded in the 
environment. Secondly, the key concept of inference for PP is liberal, which means that the 
representations have truthfulness conditions and the way they are updated is active rather than 
reactive. Thirdly, the conceptual resources related to PP allow for an interesting connection of 
this approach with other existing 4E approaches. Jakob Hohwy (2018) adds that this framework 
is able to better explain how embodied subjects interact dynamically with the environment, and 
that the boundary between the mind and the world on the one hand is self-evidencing (Hohwy 
2016 ), which means that the causes of sensory stimuli are indirectly known by inference about 
the information coming from the sensory inputs, while on the other it is causal. There is a 
dynamic feedback between the mind and the world, made possible by perception and actions in 
the world. 
 
3. 2. Radical predictive processing 
 
 The conceptions that can be included in the radical PP are much more diverse than the 
proposals under the conservative approach. It can be said that what is common to them is 
criticism or rejection of one or more commitments characterizing conservative PP. Radical PP 
is exemplified by the works (among others) of Andy Clark (2015a; 2016 etc.), Nico Orlandi 
(2016; 2017; Orlandi, Lee 2018), Jelle Bruineberg, Julian Kiverstein and Erik Rietveld (2017; 
Bruineberg, Kiverstein, Rietveld 2016; Bruineberg, Rietveld 2014) and Michael Kirkchhoff 
(2018; Kirchhoff , Robertson 2018). These authors emphasize that, firstly, action and perception 
stand in close relation to each other. Secondly, and more importantly in this context, they also 
claim that some levels of the hierarchical generative model are directly representational, whilst 
others are only indirectly so,2 being related to the world in an enactive way, which means that 
representations “aim (is) to engage the world, rather than to depict it in some action-neutral 
fashion” (Clark 2015b, 4). 
Radical PP is inspired, on the one hand, by ecological psychologists developing ideas 
proposed by James J. Gibson (1966; 1979) , and on the other hand by enactivists referring to 
the works of Francisco Varela and Humberto Maturana (Varela, Maturana, Uribe 1974; Varela, 
Thomson, Rosch 1992). Ecological approaches are characterized aptly by Pfeifer and Bongard 
                                                          
2 Some researchers belonging to radical PP reject the existence of representation at all. 
by means of the so-called "Principle of Ecological Balance". It states that, “first… that given a 
certain task environment there has to be a match between the complexities of the agent’s 
sensory, motor, and neural systems… second... that there is a certain balance or task-distribution 
between morphology, materials, control, and environment"(2007, 123).  
We can now return to the responses to Zahavi’s representational objection. Criticism of 
PP framework as a form of idealism, constructivism or neurorepresentationalism seems to be 
based on a very selective reading of various interpretations of PP. Only those researchers who 
can be included in the conservative PP are criticized. Representationalism and internalism are 
key to this approach. In his criticism, however, Zahavi does not refer to the authors included in 
the radical PP, which does not show strong commitments towards representation, while 
underlining the closer relationship between the generative model and the environment. 
However, Zahavi's approach can be defended by saying, for example, that some anti-realistic 
and constructivist assumptions are inscribed in the very idea of PP, which is based on inferential 
and probabilistic treatment of perception. Is this really the case? To answer this question, I will 
refer to the example of the ecological approach of PP proposed by Nico Orladni (2016; 2017).  
Contrary to representational interpretations of PP, Orlandi proposes an approach that 
completely breaks with Helmholtz's constructivism. The author defends the belief that PP is not 
inferential and constructivist, but ecological. She justifies her position based on the Natural 
Scene Statistics model. This model assumes that (1) perceptive systems are used to interpret 
images; and that (2) they evolved in response to the physical properties of the environment 
(Geisler, Diehl 2003; Geisler 2008). In addition, this model discovers certain statistical 
properties in the environment, thanks to which we can perceive regular properties of images 
rather than, as constructivism maintains, rely on our prior knowledge about them. It is not that 
we perceive the world as so structured because of the way we process information. Rather, it is 
the world we live in that has already a certain regularity that has meaning for us as embodied 
and embedded in the environment of biological systems (Orlandi 2016, 13). Orlandi shows that 
the Bayesian generative model is in fact relativized to the Natural Scene Statistics, or more 
figuratively: to the environment. Why? Because, with the exception of some initial perceptive 
hypotheses, it postulates the existence of structures that are not representations but certain 
constants present in the environment. Thus, Bayesian perceptual inferences are in fact not 
inferences, but processes that are armed with detection mechanisms. Detectors are usually 
understood as those states that monitor proximal conditions, i.e. which stimulus or object is 
closer to the reference point (perception), as well as those that causally affect each other. They 
do not model any objects or relationships between them and operate on a very limited scale. 
The behaviour of the system that uses detectors is based on information from the monitored 
environment. What a system can do is explained by referring to a specific environmental 
situation on which the detectors are set.3 
Nico Orladni's proposal (cf. also Orladni 2017) suggests that one can explain the 
generative model without referring to (1) inferentialism and (2) internal representations. If this 
is the case, and her use of the Natural Scene Statistics proves this, it turns out that it is possible 
to interpret PP as a framework which breaks with both constructivism and representationalism 
and which can be described as ecological, provided that the term is associated with 
psychological and epistemological directness of perception and acceptance of the anti-
representativist thesis. Orlandi's analyses show that neither constructivism, inferentialism, nor 
representationalism are implicitly contained in PP's assumptions. The way in which PP is 
interpreted therefore depends on a number of theoretical and meta-theoretical assumptions. 
From this perspective, it must be said that the criticism made by Zahavi and others cannot be 
sustained and that it concerns only a limited portion of PP research.  
The analyses carried out here also lead to several more general conclusions:  
1. How PP is applied is closely related to a number of theoretical and methodological 
assumptions and solutions;  
2. The basic assumptions of PP do not specify which of the approaches (conservative or 
radical) and interpretations (representationalist, enactive, anti-representationalist, 
ecological, etc.) are appropriate and satisfactory;  
3. PP does not lead directly to constructivist, neurorepresentationalist or fictionalist 
theses. 
 
4. In response to objection from indirect perception: 
Three meanings of directness of perception in predictive processing 
 
According to Zahavi, direct objects of perception are in fact mental constructs. "The 
visually appearing rose, the touched ice-cube, the heard melody, etc., are all brain generated 
representations, are all internal to and contained in the brain" (Zahavi 2018, 49). This means 
that we never have direct access to objects in the world. Zahavi refers here to the words of 
Hohwy, who claims that there is an "evidentiary boundary" separating the brain from everything 
outside the skull (Hohwy 2016). This approach, Zahavi believes, leads to a dualistic position. 
                                                          
3 Examples of detectors are some of the cells of the human immune system. 
There is no direct access to reality because perception is a form of testing hypotheses (see 
Gregory 1980) and ultimately it consists in inferring about the causes of sensation based on the 
content of the sensory signal. Zahavi says that, due to this understanding of perception, PP is 
becoming a modern form of neo-Kantianism with its epistemological and metaphysical 
consequences (Zahavi 2018, 49-53). 
Zahavi's criticism is somewhat understandable. Analysing the statements of Hohwy and 
Clark, one can understand why this author explicitly declares that PP assumes only indirect 
access to reality outside the cognitive system and for this reason "we should reject all claims 
concerning the existence of a seamless tight coupling between mind and world" (Zahavi, 2018, 
49). Let's take a closer look. 
Hohwy states that " perception is indirect […] what we perceive is the brain’s best 
hypothesis" (2007, 322). It is indirect in the sense that the external states of affairs "remain 
hidden behind the veil of sensory input and can only be inferred’’ (Hohwy 2013," (Hohwy 
2013, 50). "It is thus not satisfactory to claim that the perceptual relation is direct, nor to claim 
it is indirect. The right response to this situation is not to force a choice between them but to try 
to reconceive the perceptual relation to the world such that we do not have to choose between 
perception being ‘direct’ or ‘indirect’ in the first place” (Hohwy 2013, 228). The point is that 
"from inside the skull the brain has to infer the hidden causes of its sensory input, which 
crucially depends on interaction with the ‘creatures’ body." (Hohwy 2013, 220) etc. It is not 
difficult to notice that Hohwy emphasizes the indirect nature of perception. On the other hand, 
he is not fully convinced that such a description satisfactorily reflects the relationship between 
the brain and the environment, because the latter can be treated as an organ explaining the 
embodied mind (cf. Hohwy 2015; 2018). 
Let's move on to Clark. In his opinion, the problem of directness or indirectness of 
perception is a "delicate issue" that will not be resolved (Clark 2013b, 493). Elsewhere he 
claims that "it is difficult for sensory systems to deduce the causes of sensory stimulation from 
their bodily effects" (Clark 2016, 19). "The brain must discover information about the probable 
causes of sensory signals without any form of direct access to their sources (Clark 2016, 16). 
"All that it “knows”, in any direct sense, are the ways its own states (e.g., spike trains) flow and 
alter. In that (restricted) sense, all the system has direct access to is its own states." (Clark 2013a, 
183). "What we perceive is the world, as (hopefully) revealed by the best hypothesis. Nor is 
there any sense in which the objects of perception are here being treated as anything like 
Moorian ‘sense data’ 60, where these are conceived as proxies intervening between the 
perceiver and the world. "(Clark 2013b, 492). Finally, he adds that he associates PP with a 
„metaphysical perspective [that] may most safely be dubbed ‘not-indirect perception’ ”(Clark 
2013b, 493). Clark, like Hohwy, is ambivalent about the problem of indirect / direct perception. 
Interestingly, he rejects the classically understood phenomenalism, assuming the existence of 
some representations or impression data between the subject and the world, saying that only 
access to his own internal states is direct. 
In an important article Direct perception and the predictive mind (2017) Zoe Drayson 
convincingly shows that PP supporters use the concepts of directness and indirectness in three 
irreducible senses: psychological, metaphysical and epistemological. More importantly, in her 
opinion, individual authors dealing with PP often do not distinguish the sense of the concept of 
directness/indirectness, which they use, which further hinders the proper reading of their 
intentions. In practice, this means that, for example, perception can be indirect in the 
psychological sense, and direct in the metaphysical and epistemological sense. Let's take a 
closer look at those three senses. 
Speaking about the psychological sense of the concept of directness/indirectness, one 
means that perception either is or is not inferential. The sources of this distinction should be 
sought in the works of James J. Gibson (1967; 1979), who showed that the question about the 
psychological directness of perception concerns primarily the way in which stimuli 
(information coming from sensory inputs) are processed. In this way, Gibson contrasted views 
that understand perceptions in a constructivist fashion, i.e. those that are based on the so-called 
perceptual inferences (cf. Gregory 1980) with internal representations or the ecological 
approach, which implies the "direct or immediate awareness of objects and events when the 
perceptual system resonates so as to pick up information” (1967, 168). The constructivist 
approach presupposes the psychological indirectness of perception, and the ecological one - its 
psychological directness. 
The metaphysical concept of directness / indirectness refers to the way in which one 
should think about the objects of perception and the relationship between these objects and the 
subject perceiving them. This method should do justice to our veridical experiences, i.e. those 
for which we can declare truthfulness or falsity, while taking into account our non-veridical 
experiences (e.g. dreams) (Cf. Burge 2011; Drayson 2017, 9). This problem is addressed by 
such metaphysical theories of perception as naïve realism, phenomenalism or the theory of 
sensory data. For example, the naïve realist, says Zahavi , maintains that the world itself is the 
object of his own perception. The perception of physical objects and their properties is real 
experience. In the case of veridical experiences, their content is determined by these objects 
together with their properties. Non-veridical experiences, on the other hand, are not what one 
experiences, so their content cannot be constituted by the objects (dreams are an example of the 
content of such experiences). This leads to the conclusion that assumes the so-called 
metaphysical disjunctivism according to which there is both veridical and non-veridical 
perception, even if it is not possible to show the difference between these types of experiences 
(cf. Burge 2005; McDowell 2013). To keep his beliefs about the metaphysical directness of 
perception, the proponent of this approach must accept the non-intuitive claim about the 
metaphysical individuation of his perceptual states (Drayson 2017, 10). A proponent of sensory 
data theory will maintain that perception is essentially based on the perception of internal 
mental entities or "sensory data." Thus, veridical and non-veridical cases of perceptual 
experience can be classified as the same type of experience because their reference object is the 
same. Perception is therefore veridical when there is a correspondence between a sensory data 
and the outside world, and is non-veridical when there is no such correspondence. 
Directness / indirectness in an epistemological sense refers to the nature of our 
perceptual beliefs about the world and the way we justify them. If beliefs are justified in a non-
inferential way, they are direct. If they are justified in an inferential way, they are indirect 
perceptive beliefs. A given belief is justified non-inferentially when it is justified by such states 
which are not themselves justified. In other words, a belief is directly justified if it is not based 
on other beliefs, but, for example, specific perceptual experience. In this approach, the naïve 
realist assumes direct justifications for perceptual beliefs, while the sensory data theorist 
believes they are justified indirectly. According to Drayson, problems with the epistemological 
concept of the direct / indirect perception in PP are caused by the various functions that 
researchers assign to inferences. They are used now as steps in reasoning, now as elements 
justifying given theorems (Drayson 2017, 16). It should be noted that both Hohwy and Clark  
go straight from the psychological indirectness of perception in PP to the thesis about their 
epistemological indirectness, which Drayson believes to be an abuse. 
According to Drayson, in PP, perception should be understood as indirect in the 
psychological sense, which means that it is assumed here that all information must be processed 
in some way before it is used by the cognitive system. However, this does not tip the scales in 
favor of claiming that perception is indirect in the other two senses, i.e. metaphysical and 
epistemological. PP allows the interpretation of perception both in terms of metaphysical and 
epistemological directness or indirectness. This means that the problem is not determined a 
priori, as Zahavi might suggest. The above analyses are therefore of paramount importance for 
the response to the objections and criticisms formulated by Zahavi and other researchers. 
Namely, it is not entirely clear what meaning Zahavi gives to the concepts of directness and 
realism. The attitude he defends as "our natural inclination to realism" does not allow us to 
justify the claim that PP is fundamentally constructivist and anti-realistic, because, according 
to Drayson, only in the psychological sense we can state that perception in PP is indirect. 
However, psychological indirectness does not exclude a position of either metaphysical or 
epistemological realism. Zahavi's criticism in this approach cannot be treated as well-founded, 
because it is not really known what position and what interpretation of this position the author 
argues against. 
Neither does Zahavi seem to distinguish between the indirectness of perception and its 
systematic nonreliabity. A given belief4 is justified if and only if it was created by a reliable 
cognitive process. Therefore, in order to be a reliable cognitive process, perception must lead 
to justified beliefs, which may be the starting point for making inferences, as well as to the 
emergence of new justified beliefs, which in turn leads to actions that are effective in a given 
environment. It is important that the justification of belief depends not only on the process that 
created it, but also on whether these processes are reliable in the real world. In this sense, a 
justified belief is one that, to put it simply, comes from cognitive operations that are effective 
(Goldman, 1986, 182). A supporter of PP may therefore claim that perception is in some sense 
indirect, while defending the thesis that perception understood in this way must be at least to 
some degree "faithful" to reality, otherwise it could not effectively minimize prediction errors. 
By minimizing potential prediction errors, the generative model expects information reaching 
the brain to be reliable to some extent. If it was not, it would not be possible to update its internal 
model of  the world. The point is therefore to prevent the model from being unduly distorted by 
unreliable data. This means that the indirect nature of perception does not imply, as Zahavi 
suggests, a lack of reference to the world. Of course, there are cognitive operations that have a 
greater degree of justification for the truth of beliefs (e.g. long-term observation) and those that 
justify the truth of beliefs to a lesser degree (e.g. a cursory observation). However, this does not 
change the fact that, in PP, perception fulfills not only the function of providing information, 
but also its initial justification. This is directly related to the Bayesian nature of changing and 
updating the internal parameters of the generative model based on a probabilistic network of 
prior beliefs and abductive reasoning (cf. Kiefer 2017). 
 
5. Response to the objection from anti-realism: 
                                                          
4 Belief in PP is not a term form folk psychology. It does not imply existence of any propositional attitude. Rather 
it refers to whatever plays the functional role of top-down prediction in the generative model (Sims 2017, 2).  
 
S-representations in predictive processing 
 
Zahavi finds that, in PP framework, "a central claim is that the brain doesn’t process all 
the information it receives, but rather focuses its resources on unexpected input." (Zahavi 2018, 
48). Given the rather vague description, it is difficult to say what Zahavi means here. 
Nevertheless, as he explains further in his argument: "To minimize costly surprises, however, 
the brain constantly seeks to anticipate what signals its sensory organs will be receiving. To do 
this as efficiently as possible, the brain constructs internal models of the possible causes of 
those inputs. These models allow the brain to better predict likely inputs, and these predictions 
are then continuously compared with the actual incoming sensory inputs. In case of error - i.e., 
if there is a large discrepancy between the predicted and actual inputs - the model is revised and 
improved "(Zahavi 2018, 48). It is difficult to disagree with such a reconstruction. Basically, 
this is how the operation of the brain can be described in the PP framework. However, the 
conclusions Zahavi draws are problematic. He is aware of the fact that PP offers a scientific 
explanation of the nature of perception, but he does not distinguish what can be described as an 
empirical observation report of certain data from their interpretation. He asks: "how can we 
ever know that our scientific theories, which are offered as explanations of the world of 
experience, really capture external reality? Why are they not merely elaborate cognitive 
extrapolations that remain as brain-generated and as internal to our constitution as everything 
else? " And he continues: "How are scientists able to transcend their internal world simulation? 
How do they manage to pull off this epistemic achievement?" (Zahavi 2018, 53). According to 
Zahavi, if PP is accepted as a credible theory of how the brain "reaches" external reality, then 
it will be necessary to abandon "our naïve realism", i.e. our confidence in the objective existence 
of ordinary objects of experience, (Zahavi 2018, 54) i.e. "our natural inclination for realism" 
(Zahavi 2018, 48). 
Accepting Zahavi's arguments, we can have reasonable doubts about whether science 
tells us anything at all about the world of our experience. Rather, scientific explanations 
"construct" a certain scientific picture of the world that should be opposed, or at least, as far as 
possible, juxtaposed with the picture of the world of our experience (cf. Sellars 1962/1991). 
Here we come to the well-known dispute about scientific realism, whose full analysis and 
consequences for PP go far beyond the framework adopted for this paper. Namely, is the 
assumption of naïve realism in the context of modern science to some extent justified? I will 
not answer this question here but will limit myself to such a discussion of the problem of 
scientific realism that will put Zahavi's view in perspective. 
 5. 1. Concept of scientific realism 
 
Researchers have different definitions of the concept of scientific realism, but it can 
generally be assumed the position consists in an epistemically positive attitude toward the 
outputs of scientific investigation, regarding both observable and unobservable aspects of the 
world (see Chakravartty 2017). For the purposes of these considerations, I will accept the 
understanding of scientific realism as such a position, which I understand to mean that both 
subjects of experience and at least some subjects or theoretical processes really exist. Anti-
realism, on the other hand, can be defined as a position that recognizes the reality of objects of 
everyday experience, but refuses the reality of various theoretical objects. Scientific realism can 
be defined in terms of epistemic achievements created by theories and scientific models. Here, 
realism is associated with the current epistemic status of a given theory or model, and can be 
described, for example, in terms of truth and falsehood. It can also be defined in terms of the 
epistemic aims of scientific inquiry (van Fraassen 1980, 8; Lyons 2005), i.e. it is interested in 
what the goals of a given theory or model are. The realist will maintain that their purpose is to 
create true or at least approximately true descriptions of the world or phenomena, while the 
anti-realist may claim that the aims of scientific practice are purely pragmatic.5 
Chakrabartty suggests that scientific realism should be understood in three basic ways, 
i.e. (1) ontological, (2) semantic and (3) epistemological: 
 
(1) Ontological scientific realism assumes that the world studied by science exists 
independently of the mind. 
(2) Semantic scientific realism is associated with the literal interpretation of scientific 
claims about the world. This means that claims about scientific objects, events, 
processes, properties and relationships should be literally understood as having truth 
values: true or false. This semantic commitment contrasts primarily with certain 
"instrumentalist" epistemologies that interpret descriptions of unobservable phenomena 
simply as tools for predicting observable phenomena or for systematizing observational 
reports. Instrumentalists maintain that the claims of unobservable things have no literal 
meaning. 
                                                          
5 For a critique of this approach to scientific realism, see Devitt 2005.  
(3) In epistemological terms, scientific realism assumes that theoretical statements 
(interpreted literally as describing reality independent of the mind) constitute knowledge 
of the world. This approach should be contrasted with a position that, for example, 
accepts scientific realism in a metaphysical and semantic dimension, but rejects or 
doubts the belief that scientific research is epistemologically strong enough to provide 
true knowledge about phenomena. 
 
It should be noted that Zahavi doubts the scientific realism of PP: "What is currently being 
questioned is not whether we are fallible cognizers, or whether science is a worthwhile 
enterprise, but rather how the position in question can so confidently embrace scientific 
realism" (Zahavi 2018 , 53). If Zahavi is right, then the following problem arises: why does 
explaining the brain with the concept of mental representations imply representationalism in 
relation to the description of world experience by cognitive agents? After all, for anti-realists, 
theoretical objects do not have to have any real designates (ontological anti-realists), or they 
only fulfil instrumental functions (semantic anti-realists), or knowledge about them is only 
probable or doubtful (epistemic anti-realists). In other words: it may be that we explain the brain 
using representational concepts, while rejecting representations as real elements of cognizing 
the world or valuable theoretical objects. We can therefore reject what I will describe as an 
ontic hypothesis regarding representation, which states that natural cognitive systems actually 
use representations; at the same time, we may adopt the epistemic hypothesis that the best 
models and/or explanations of natural cognitive systems refer to explicit representations (see 
Chemero 2000).  
 By doing so, we will argue that cognitive processes can be explained based on 
representational concepts, while proclaiming that the cognitive system is not representational 
itself. Our belief in representational explanations will therefore have either an instrumental or 
fictional character (cf. Egan 2014; Downey 2017). Zahavi, however, does not explain this issue, 
and for this reason, I say, he mixes these two hypotheses. In other words, he does not distinguish 
between what he explains (explanans) and what is explained (explanandum), which ultimately 
leads him to skepticism about the "realism" and "directness" of PP. It is not entirely clear 
whether he means the epistemic or ontic hypothesis when he speaks about the representative 
nature of PP. Arguments for both can be found in the extensive PP literature (cf. Clark 2015a; 
Downey 2017; Gładziejewski 2016; 2017b; Kiefer, Hohwy 2018; Williams 2018). 
 In this section I will show that the representationalism postulated by conservative PP 
allows to justify the thesis that PP is a position of scientific realism. For this purpose, I refer to 
the analysis of the concept of structural representations (S-representations), which, according 
to some authors, meet PP requirements well (see Gładziejewski 2016; Kiefer, Hohwy 2018). I 
will show that S-representations are not fictitious objects and that, on their basis, it is possible 
to formulate non-trivial explanations of relevant phenomena (explanations by means of 
representation). Next, I will argue for the ontic nature of explanations using the S-
representation, based on the mechanistic model of scientific explanations. 
 
5. 2. S-representations in predictive processing 
 
 S-representations are mental representations that operate on the basis of a structural 
similarity between the representation itself and what is represented (see Cummins 1996; 
Gładziejewski, Miłkowski 2017; O’Brien, Opie 2004; Shagrir 2012; Shea 2014). They guide 
the actions of their users, are detachable, and also allow their vehicles to recognize a 
representational error.6 There are strong arguments in support of the thesis that the 
representations postulated by conservative PP are structural (cf. Gładziejewski 2016; Kiefer, 
Hohwy 2018). I will not repeat them here. I will confine myself to discussing their role in 
explaining cognitive systems. Gładziejewski and Miłkowski (2017) argue that the vehicles of 
internal S-representations can be treated as components of cognitive mechanisms, as well as 
goals of various cognitive operations. Their argumentation is based on the statement that 
structural representations are casually relevant. This means that explanations of cognitive 
phenomena that refer to the notion of S-representation may be true because of the similarity 
between representation and its target. Structural correspondence can „literally cause the 
representation-user to be successful at whatever she (or it) is using the representation for, and 
lack of structural correspondence can cause the user to fail at whatever she (or it) is using the 
representation for” (Gładziejewski, Miłkowski 2017, 340). Success or failure is therefore 
causally dependent on the occurrence of a structural similarity or lack thereof. For this reason  
S-representations should thus be construed as causal explanations of certain facts regarding 
similarity as an explanans and success or failure as an explanandum. However, such an 
approach is not precise. The appropriate interpretative framework is determined by the 
neomechanistic theory of scientific explanations (see Craver 2007; Bechtel 2008).  
In this model of explanation the mechanism whereby the phenomenon is to be explained 
should be identifiable and describable. This means, on the one hand, that the phenomenon 
                                                          
6 Gładziejewski and Miłkowski (2017) and Gładziejewski (2016) present the full characteristics of the S-
representation. 
comprises some functional components to which relevant operations may be allocated and, on 
the other, that the mechanism which explains the phenomenon may be broken down to mutually 
integrated parts which are responsible for the phenomenon (Zednik 2008, 1454). In this 
approach, "mechanism" is defined as a "structure performing a function in virtue of its 
component parts, component operations, and their organization. The orchestrated functioning 
of the mechanism is responsible for one or more phenomena" (Bechtelm Abrahamsen 2005; 
Bechtel, 2008, 13). A very important element of mechanistic explanations is the so-called 
decomposition consisting in identifying objects and processes which constitute a given 
mechanism. Generally speaking, to explain a given phenomenon is to indicate the mechanism 
responsible for its implementation. Gładziejewski and Miłkowski show that each mechanism 
equipped with S-representation as its component part is the basis for a specific cognitive ability. 
Thus, S-representations construed as components of mechanisms owe their functional 
characterization to how they contribute to the phenomenon that the larger mechanism is 
responsible for. This means that the structural similarity between the representation and what it 
represents is what contributes toward the mechanism’s proper functioning.  
Representations understood in this way perform specific causal functions in explaining 
phenomena. They therefore meet the "job description challenge" (cf. Ramsey 2007). It is worth 
noting that in the philosophical literature it has been proposed to treat spatial maps of the 
hippocampus in rats as a good example of internal S-representation (cf. Ramsey 2016; Shea 
2014). The rat’s hippocampus is considered to be an implementation of the internal map of the 
spatial layout of the environment, encoded in the Cartesian coordinate system. Co-activation 
patterns of the so-called space cells in the hippocampus are to correspond to the spatial structure 
of the rat’s environment (Shea 2014). This means that the pattern of co-activation relationships 
between site cells (roughly the tendency of individual cells to show common activity) resembles 
the structure of metric relationships between locations within the environment. In this approach, 
the hippocampal map is a component of the cognitive mechanism on which the ability to 
navigate the environment is based (Craver 2007). This is indirect evidence for the thesis of the 
ontical nature of the concept of S-representation, which is relevant to the position of scientific 
realism.7 Namely: the explanation of the function of the hippocampus in rats by means of the 
S-representation shows that this concept is not only instrumental or epistemic, but that there is 
a significant relationship between this concept and the mechanism present in the rat brain. In 
other words, the concept of S-representation fulfills a non-trivial explanatory function here. 
                                                          
7 In this context, it is worth adding that E. and M. Moser and J. O’Keefe in 2014 received the Nobel Prize for 
discovering place cells, which are literal cognitive maps. 
The above analyses lead to the following conclusions:  
(1) the concept of S-representation used in PP is explanatory and non-trivial (because it 
is causally relevant);  
(2) its explanatory significance proves that the concept of representation cannot be 
treated only in a functional or fictional way, as some researchers suggest;  
(3) this concept plays a non-trivial casual role in explaining the functioning of cognitive 
systems in PP (see Gładziejewski 2016; Kiefer, Hohwy 2018);  
(4) PP may offer mechanistic explanations for relevant cognitive phenomena (cf. 
Hohwy 2015; Gładziejewski 2019; Gordon et al. 2018; Harkness 2015)  
(5) there are strong reasons to consider mechanistic representational explanations as 
ontic, not just epistemic (cf. Craver 2009; 2013). New mechanicism is a realistic position 
because it postulates the real existence of the described mechanisms: "Distinguishing 
good mechanistic explanations from bad requires that one distinguish real components 
from fictional posits" (Craver 2007, 131);  
Therefore:  
(6) Conservative PP using the concept of S-representation is a position of scientific 
realism. The last of Zahavi’s objections is therefore rejected.  
 
Conclusion 
 
 In this article I have referred to the criticism of PP formulated by Dan Zahavi. I have 
shown that it can be reduced to three basic objections (representational objection; indirect 
perception objection; anti-realism objection). I demonstrated that the criticism is unfounded and 
justified the thesis according to which PP can be considered a position of scientific realism due 
to the fact that its conservative interpretation uses S-representations. S-representations 
interpreted in the spirit of the mechanistic theory of scientific explanations allow to formulate 
non-trivial and causally relevant explanations for specific cognitive mechanisms. For this 
reason, the criticism of PP as a form of constructivism and neurorepresentationalism is 
unfounded and based on false premises.  
 
References 
 
Anderson, M. L. (2014). After Phrenology. MIT Press. 
Anderson, M. L.(2017). „Of Bayes and Bullets: An Embodied, Situated, Targeting-Based 
Account of Predictive Processing”. In Philosophy and Predictive Processing: 4, eds. T. 
Metzinger, W. Wiese. (Frankfurt am Main: MIND Group). doi: 10.15502/9783958573055. 
Anderson ,M. L., Chemero, T. (2013). The problem with brain GUTs: conflation of different 
senses of “prediction’’ threatens metaphysical disaster. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 36 (3), 
204–205. 
Bechtel W., Abrahamsen A. (2005). Explanation: A mechanist alternative. Studies in History 
and Philosophy of Biological and Biomedical Sciences, 36, 421–441. 
Bechtel W. (2008). Mental Mechanisms: Philosophical Perspectives on Cognitive 
Neuroscience. New York: Routledge.  
Bickhard, M., Richie, D. M. (1983) On The Nature Of Representation: A Case Study Of James 
Gibson's Theory Of Perception. New York: Praeger 
Bruineberg, J. (2017). "Active Inference and the Primacy of the ‘I Can’". In Philosophy and 
Predictive Processing: 5, eds. T. Metzinger, W. Wiese. (Frankfurt am Main: MIND Group). 
doi: 10.155027/9783958573062.;  
Bruineberg, J., Kiverstein, J., Rietveld, E. (2016). The anticipating brain is not a scientist: the 
free-energy principle from an ecological-enactive perspective. Synthese, 1-28. doi: 
10.1007/s11229-016-1239-1. 
Bruineberg, J., Rietveld, E. (2014). Self-organization, free energy minimization, and optimal 
grip on a field of affordances. Frontiers in Human Neuroscience, 8, 599. 
Burge, T. (2005). Disjunctivism and Perceptual Psychology. Philosophical Topics, 33 (1), 1–
78.  
Burge, T. (2011). Disjunctivism Again. Philosophical Explorations, 14 (1), 43–80. 
Chakravartty, Anjan, "Scientific Realism", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Summer 
2017 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = 
<https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2017/entries/scientific-realism/>. access 23.05.2019.  
Clark, A. (2013a). Expecting the world: perception, prediction, and the origins of human 
knowledge. Journal of Philosophy, 110(9), 469–496. 
Clark, A. (2013b). Whatever next? Predictive brains, situated agents, and the future of cognitive 
science. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 36, 181–204. doi: 10.1017/S0140525X12000477. 
Clark, A. (2015a). Radical predictive processing. The Southern Journal of Philosophy, 53 (S1), 
3–27. 
Clark, A. (2015b). “Predicting Peace: The End of the Representation Wars-A Reply to Michael 
Madary”. In Open MIND: 7(R), eds. T. Metzinger & J. M. Windt. (Frankfurt am Main: MIND 
Group). doi: 10.15502/9783958570979 
Clark, A. (2016). Surfing Uncertainty. Prediction, Action and the Embodied Mind. Oxford: 
Oxford University Press. 
Chemero, A. (2000) Anti-representationalism and the dynamical stance, Philosophy of Science 
67 (4), 625-647 
Craver C. F. (2007). Explaining the brain. Oxford University Press, Oxford 
Craver, C. F. (2009). Mechanisms and natural kinds, Philosophical Psychology 22 (5):575-594. 
Craver, C. F. (2013). :The Ontic Account of Scientific Explanation”, In Explanation in the 
Special Sciences: The Case of Biology and History, eds. M. I. Kaiser, O. R. Scholz, D. Plenge, 
A. Hüttemann. (Springer Verlag). 27-52. 
Cummins, R. (1996). Representations, targets, and attitudes. MIT Press, Cambridge 
Devitt, M. (2005). “Scientific Realism”, in The Oxford Handbook of Contemporary Philosophy, 
eds. F. Jackson, M. Smith. (Oxford: Oxford University Press). 767–791, 
doi:10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199234769.003.0026;  
Downey, A. (2017). Predictive processing and the representation wars: A victory for the 
eliminativist (via fictionalism). Synthese, 195, 5115–5139. 
Egan, F. (2014). How to think about mental content. Philos Stud 170:115–135. 
doi:10.1007/s11098-013- 0172-0.  
Fiske S. T., Taylor S. E. (2008). Social cognition: from brains to culture. Boston: McGraw-Hill 
Higher Education. 
Friston, K. (2010). The free-energy principle:a unified brain theory? Nat. Rev. Neurosci 11, 
127–138. 
Geisler, W. S. (2008). Visual perception and the statistical properties of natural scenes. Annual 
Review of Psychology, 59, 167–192. doi: 10.1146/annurev.psych.58.110405.085632 
Geisler, W. S., Diehl, R. L. (2003). A Bayesian approach to the evolution of perceptual and 
cognitive systems. Cognitive Science, 27, 379-402. 
Gibson, J. J. (1967). New reasons for realism. Synthese, 17(1), 162–172. 
Gibson, J. (1979). The Ecological Approach to Visual Perception. New York: Psychology 
Press. 
Gładziejewski P (2016) Predictive coding and representationalism. Synthese 193:559–582. 
doi:10.1007/ s11229-015-0762-9 
Gładziejewski, P. (2017a). „The Evidence of the Senses - A Predictive Processing-Based Take 
on the Sellarsian Dilemma”. In Philosophy and Predictive Processing: 15, eds. T. Metzinger, 
W. Wiese. (Frankfurt am Main: MIND Group). doi: 10.15502/9783958573161. 
Gładziejewski, P. (2017b). Just how conservative is conservative predictive processing? Hybris 
38, 98-122. 
Gładziejewski, P (2019). Mechanistic unity and the predictive mind. Theory & Psychology, doi. 
10.1177/0959354319866258 
Gładziejewski, P. Miłkowski, M. (2017) Structural representations: causally relevant and 
different from detectors. Biol Philos 32:337–355 DOI 10.1007/s10539-017-9562-6 
Goldman, A. (1977). A Theory of Human Action. Princeton: Princeton University Press. 
(Goldman, A. (1986). „What is Justified Belief?”, In Empirical Knowledge, ed. P. Moser 
(Rowman & Littlefield Publishers). 171–192. 
Gordon, N., Tsuchiya, N., Koenig-Robert, R., Hohwy, J. (2018). Expectation and attention 
increase the integration of top-down and bottom-up signals in perception through different 
pathways. bioRxiv, 446948. 
Gregory, R. L. (1980). Perceptions as hypotheses. Phil. Trans. R. Soc. Lond., Series B, 
Biological Sciences, 290, 181-197. 
Harkness, D. L., Keshava, A. (2017). „Moving from the What to the How and Where – Bayesian 
Models and Predictive Processing”. In Philosophy and Predictive Processing: 16, eds. T. 
Metzinger, W. Wiese. (Frankfurt am Main: MIND Group). doi: 10.15502/9783958573178 
Hohwy, J. (2007) Functional integration and the mind. Synthese 159 (3): 315-328. 
Hohwy, J. (2013). The predictive mind. Oxford: Oxford University Press.  
Hohwy, J. (2016). The self-evidencing brain. Noûs, 50(2), 259-285.  
Hohwy, J. (2015). The Neural Organ Explains the Mind. In Open MIND: 19(T), eds. T. 
Metzinger, J. M. Windt. (Frankfurt am Main: MIND Group) doi: 10.15502/9783958570016 
Hohwy, J. (2018). „The Predictive Processing Hypothesis”, In The Oxford Handbook of 4E 
Cognition, eds. A. Newen, L. S. de Bruin, Gallagher, S. (Oxford University Press), 129-145. 
Harkness, D. L. (2015). „From Explanatory Ambition to Explanatory Power - A Commentary 
on Jakob Hohwy”. In Open MIND: 19(C), eds. T. Metzinger, J. M. Windt. (Frankfurt am Main: 
MIND Group). doi: 10.15502/9783958570153.  
Kiefer, A. (2017). „Literal Perceptual Inference”. In Philosophy and Predictive Processing: 17, 
eds. T. Metzinger, W. Wiese. (Frankfurt am Main: MIND Group). doi: 
10.15502/9783958573185. 
Kiefer, A., & Hohwy, J. (2017). Content and misrepresentation in hierarchical generative 
models. Synthese, 195, 2387–2415. 
Kirkchhoff, M. (2018). Predictive processing, perceiving and imagining: Is to perceive to 
imagine, or something close to it? Philos Stud 175: 751. doi: 10.1007/s11098-017-0891-8 
Kirchhoff, M. , Robertson, I. (2018). Enactivism and predictive processing: a non-
representational view. Philosophical explorations 2(21). doi: 
10.1080/13869795.2018.1477983. 
McDowell, J. (2013). Perceptual Experience: Both Relational and Contentful. European 
Journal of Philosophy, 21 (1), 144–157. 
Norman, D. (2013). Design of Everyday Things: Revised and Expanded. New York: Basic 
Books. London: MIT Press  
Lau 2002 [2002], ”Externalism About Mental Content”, In Stanford Encyclopedia of 
Philosophy, ed. E. N. Zalta. (Stanford, CSLI Publications, (http://plato.stanford.edu)), 1-13. 
access: 02.08.2019. 
Lyons, Timothy D., (2005). Towards a Purely Axiological Scientific Realism, Erkenntnis 
63(2): 167–204. doi:10.1007/s10670-005-3225-8 
O’Brien. G., Opie. J. (2004). „Notes towards a structuralist theory of mental representation”. In 
Representation in mind: new approaches to mental representation, eds. H. Clapin, P. Staines, 
P. Slezak. (Elsevier, Amsterdam), 1–20. 
Orlandi, N. (2016). Bayesian perception is ecological perception. Philosophical Topics, 44(2), 
327-351. 
Orlandi, N. (2017). Predictive perceptual systems. Synthese, 1-20. doi: 10.1007/s11229-017-
1373-4.  
Orlandi, N., Lee, G. (2018). How Radical is Predictive Processing? In Andy Clark & Critics, 
Eds., Colombo,, M. , Irvine, E., Stapleton, M. (Oxford University Press). doi: 
10.1093/oso/9780190662813.003.0016. 
Pfeifer, R., and Bongard, J. (2006). How the Body Shapes the Way We Think: A New View of 
Intelligence, MIT Press, Cambridge: MA. 
Ramsey W. M. (2007) Representation reconsidered. Cambridge University Press. 
Ramsey W. M. (2016) Untangling two questions about mental representation. New Ideas 
Psychol 40, 3–12. doi:10.1016/j.newideapsych.2015.01.004;  
Shagrir O (2012) Structural representations and the brain. Br J Philos Sci 63, 519–545. 
doi:10.1093/bjps/ axr038. 
Shea N (2014) Exploitable isomorphism and structural representation. Proc Aristot Soc 
CXIV:77–92. doi:10.1111/j.1467-9264.2014.00367.x  
Sellars, W. (1962/1991). “Philosophy and the Scientific Image of Man.” In W. Sellars. Science, 
Perception and Reality. (Atascadero: Ridgeview Publishing Company). 1-40.  
Sims, A. (2017). “The Problems with Prediction - The Dark Room Problem and the Scope 
Dispute”. In Philosophy and Predictive Processing: 23, eds. T. Metzinger, W. Wiese. 
(Frankfurt am Main: MIND Group). doi: 10.15502/9783958573246. 
Sprevak M (2013) Fictionalism about neural representations. Monist 96, 539–560. doi:10.5840/ 
monist201396425 
Swanson, L. R. (2016). The predictive processing paradigm has roots in Kant. Frontiers in 
Systems Neuroscience, 10, 79. doi: 10.3389/fnsys.2016.00079. 
Wiese, W. (2016). What are the contents of representations in predictive processing? 
Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences, 1-22. doi: 10.1007/s11097-016- 9472-0. 
Williams, D. (2018). Predictive coding and thought. Synthese, 1–27. doi: 10.1007/s11229-018-
1768-x. 
van Fraassen, Bas C., (1980). The Scientific Image. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Varela, F., Maturana, H., Uribe, R. (1974). Autopoiesis: The organization of living systems, its 
characterization and a model. Biosystems, 5 (4), 187–196.  
Varela, F., Thompson, E. Rosch, E. (1991). The embodied mind: Cognitive science and human 
experience. Cambridge, MA, London, UK: The MIT Press.  
Zahavi, D. (2018). Brain, Mind, World: Predictive Coding, Neo-Kantianism, and 
Transcendental Idealism. Husserl Studies 34, 47-61. doi: 10.1007/s10743-017-9218-z. 
Zednik C. (2008). Dynamical Models and Mechanistic Explanations, In Proceedings of the 30th 
Annual Conference of the Cognitive Science Society, eds. B. C. Love, K. McRae, V. M. 
Sloutsky, (Austin, TX: Cognitive Science Society). 1454-1459. 
 
 
 
